

















































This document is not an official publication of the Inter-American Development Bank. The purpose of the 
Economic and Social Study Series is to provide a mechanism for discussion of selected analytical works related to 
the development of the country members of the Regional Operations Department I. The opinions and conclusions 
contained in this document are exclusively those of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies and 
opinions of the Bank’s management, the member countries, or the institutions with which the authors are 
affiliated.      
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
T TO OW WA AR RD DS S   A A   S ST TR RA AT TE EG GY Y   F FO OR R   E EC CO ON NO OM MI IC C   G GR RO OW WT TH H   I IN N   








        Ricardo Hausmann                                          Andrés Rodríguez-Clare 





















This is a report prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank.  We thank Eduardo Fernandez-Arias for his 




The Uruguayan economy is recovering from the 2002 financial crisis that disrupted its 
banking system, caused a collapse of its currency and seriously affected its fiscal solvency 
(Figure 1). The crisis was clearly associated with the collapse of the Argentine economy and its 
concomitant currency, banking and debt crises. Both were also related to the sudden stop that 
followed the Russian crisis of 1998, which prompted an important realignment of the real in 
January 1999, a fact that had exerted enormous pressure on bilateral exchange rates within 
Mercosur. The impact on Uruguay would have been severe in the best of circumstances, given 
the importance of Argentina’s aggregate demand and relative prices on its smaller neighbor, but 
the effect was amplified by the presence of Argentine troubled banks in the Uruguayan financial 
system. With a heavily dollarized banking system and public debt, a major real exchange rate 
realignment would – under any circumstance – seriously damage the solvency of the fisc and the 
banks. Not surprisingly, the Uruguayan economy went on a serious tailspin. It had the worst 
growth performance of any Latin American country in the period between 1998 and 2003 with 




Nevertheless, the political system managed the crisis with great responsibility. It avoided 
the behavior of Argentina in terms of violation of contracts and rules as it confronted the crisis. 
To manage the situation the authorities negotiated a debt exchange with its bondholders, 
achieved significant support from the international financial community and imposed a 
temporary deposit freeze on public banks. But its management of the situation left the impression 
that its political system – including the opposition – had behaved responsibly under the harshest 
circumstances and, if anything, was able to reestablish macro balance with a minimal damage to 
its reputation. This is reflected, among other indicators, in the fact that inflation was kept under 
control and quickly returned to single digits (Figure 2), frozen deposits were promptly returned 
and country risk has gone from acute distress levels to almost pre-crisis levels (Figure 3). Today, 
while Argentina is still in a state of default and has yet to get back to capital markets, Uruguay 
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Macro balance has been reestablished, in spite of the weaker public debt ratios left by the 
crisis and the economy has been recovering since the second quarter of 2003. This must be taken 
as a very significant achievement of the Uruguayan polity. More surprisingly, our mission found 
that animal spirits have come back in full force. The new weaker level of the real exchange rate 
is obviously positive for the potential profitability of the tradable sector. Interestingly, in 
Uruguay this has led to numerous and very concrete investment opportunities which appear to 
have large growth potential: we found significant optimism from entrepreneurs about prospects 
for such products as meat, rice, soybeans, forestry, pulp and paper, ports, tourism, software and 
the export of business services.  
 
New growth opportunities 
 
The reestablishment of macro balance, a more competitive real exchange rate, and a 
political system and institutions that have earned credibility and trust under fire underpin each of 
these investment opportunities.  But in addition, we found that behind each of the principal 
investment opportunities lies the provision of critical public goods. Meat has reappeared in the 
scene thanks to the capacity of Uruguay to control foot and mouth disease through improved 
animal sanitation and tracking techniques. Rice has benefited from a public-private partnership 
in seed development through INIA that has increased productivity to the highest global standards. 
Forestry has benefited from a consistent policy of investment subsidies and of the perceived 
commitment to the sector in terms of attracting the complementary investments in pulp and paper 
and in port infrastructure. Tourism has benefited from a consistent policy to broaden destinations, 
diversify markets and provide the needed infrastructure, advertisement and security. Software 
has benefited from the high level of public education in the country as well as from an adequate 
tax treatment. Overall, behind every potential new area of growth lies not only a macroeconomic   5
and macro-institutional explanation but also the presence of good sectoral institutions and an 
ability of the Uruguayan polity to achieve economically effective and socially legitimate public-
private cooperation.  
 
The new areas of growth are mostly in rather traditional areas in which the country can 
leverage its natural advantages. One important question is why is it now that these activities 
appear so promising? Why were these opportunities not exploited in the last 20 years? What 
characteristics did the pattern of growth exhibit that explains the limits to growth in these areas?  
 
The role of the real exchange rate 
 
One explanation has to do with the evolution of the real exchange rate in the context of 
regional economic trends. The investment opportunities mentioned above involve the production 
of goods for global markets: agricultural products such as beef, rice, soybeans and forestry are 
globally traded. Their profitability depends on the international prices of those goods in US 
dollars and on the real exchange rate of Uruguay vis a vis the dollar. However, Uruguay is 
deeply integrated with Argentina and Brazil and these two countries have a powerful effect on its 
macroeconomy, including on its real exchange rate vis a vis the US dollar. Here it is useful to 
distinguish between the 1980s in the aftermath of the debt crisis and the 1990s. In the 1980s, all 
countries suffered significant real depreciations vis a vis the US dollar while in the 1990s they all 
appreciated strongly. In the case of Uruguay, after a drastic depreciation around 1982, the 
multilateral real exchange rate remained relatively flat (with some deflationary trend) until the 
end of 1990. From then on it entered a strong real appreciation trend until its crisis in 2002. By 
contrast, while Argentina and Brazil also exhibit these broad trends, they show much more 
volatility. In addition, their depreciations in the late 1990s and earlier in this decade happened at 
different dates. As a consequence, bilateral real exchange rates have been quite volatile. The 
1990s saw a period of relatively stable bilateral real exchange rates with Uruguay’s neighbors at 
a rather appreciated real exchange rate, accompanied by an appreciation vis a vis the US dollar. 
This created incentives in favor of regional goods and against global goods and Uruguay’s 
tradable production was shifted towards deeper integration with Mercosur.  
 
This pattern was first broken in January 1999 when Brazil devalued and later in 
December 2001 when Argentina did the same. Both events involved in addition to a shift of 
relative prices, an important decline in aggregate demand in the two countries. As a consequence, 
Uruguay was hit by a major reduction in regional demand for its goods. Adjustment required a 
large real depreciation vis a vis the US dollar. But with a highly dollarized financial system and 
public debt, the depreciation would entail serious solvency problems. However, it reestablished 
the conditions of profitability for its global goods sector.  
 
This story clearly indicates that with respect to a scenario in which Uruguay only 
produced for the regional market, the presence of both regional and global goods makes the 
country more stable. When aggregate demand in Argentina and Brazil is relatively strong, 
buoyed say, by strong terms of trade or capital inflows, their real exchange rates appreciate vis a 
vis the US dollar. This demand spills over into Uruguay causing an expansionary impulse there 
and redirecting resources away from global goods and into regional goods. As a consequence, 
the real exchange rate of Uruguay vis a vis the dollar also appreciates. When demand collapses 
in Argentina and Brazil, the process is reversed. The presence of global goods limits the fall of 
Uruguayan income when the regional economy is weak, as these activities can expand while the   6
regional goods sector necessarily contract. If Uruguay was purely specialized in global goods, it 
could avoid importing the volatility from its neighbors. However, it is unclear that it would 
maximize its wellbeing by following this strategy. Forgoing the sale of tourist, trade and 
financial services to Argentina and Brazil so as to avoid volatility is surely not an optimal 
strategy. As Uruguayans are keenly aware, the country cannot walk away from its geography. 
The question is simply how to manage the coexistence of these two types of markets.  
 
The Mercosur context 
 
  During our visit we sensed that different political organizations and social groups had 
come up with two opposite answers to this dilemma: one is to deepen integration within 
Mercosur, by advancing towards a real customs union and harmonizing other policy areas. The 
other strategy is to limit integration into Mercosur so as to be in a position to better protect its 
global goods sector. This would involve negotiating a status similar to Chile’s within Mercosur 
so as to have the freedom to set external tariffs independently and be in a position to lower them 
significantly. Such a strategy would facilitate growth in the global goods sector by eliminating 
the anti-export bias of Mercosur protection and by limiting the importation of volatility from its 
neighbors. This is an important issue that we will try to address in this report.  
 
Some of the global goods that Uruguay exports can be sold in regional markets: rice and 
milk are good examples. Since these goods have high protection in Brazil, Uruguay can benefit 
from the higher price in that market associated with Brazilian protection, which Uruguay need 
not pay. This should at least count as a static gain to be compared with the losses caused by 
imposing higher tariff barriers in order to protect Argentinean and Brazilian industry. It also 
shelters these sectors from the excessive volatility of the dollar real exchange rate.  Other goods, 
such as meat are also exported by the other Mercosur countries and hence must be sold outside 
the region. These will suffer from the anti-export bias caused by Mercosur protectionism and by 
the real exchange rate volatility vis a vis the dollar that the macro instability in these countries 
generates.  
 
However, during the 1990s deeper integration with Mercosur both induced real 
appreciation in Uruguay and cushioned the country from its negative growth effects by allowing 
some of the tradable activities to survive and even to expand into the protected regional market. 
If real appreciation was going to take place anyway, say because of the effect of Argentina’s 
appreciation through the demand for tourism services in Uruguay, where tariffs are not an issue, 
then the net effect of the trade agreement may have actually been positive for Uruguayan 
industry, although a free trade area agreement – a la Chile-Mercosur – would have been even 
better.  
 
The growth context 
 
Beyond macro fluctuations, it is important to gauge the determinants of the underlying 
growth trends of Uruguay. The recent economic history of the country is punctuated by two 
enormous falls in output: the 1982 debt crisis and the recent 2002 financial crisis. If we take the 
growth performance of Uruguay between the peak years of 1981 and 1998, the cumulative per   7
capita growth rate was a meager 0.7 percent.
1 If instead, one measures it from the trough of 1984 
to the trough of 2002 growth in per capita income was 1.1 percent.
2  
 
In the longer period between the peak-years of 1956 and 1998, per capita growth was 1 
percent. According to the World Development Indicators growth, between 1960 and 1998 was 
0.9 percent. Since growth in the US was about 2 percent, this means that between 1960 and 1998 
Uruguay’s per capita income fell from 28.3 percent of the US average to 19.0 percent.  
 
We conclude that roughly speaking long run per capita growth has averaged about 1 
percent which implies that the country has been growing less than the technological frontier over 
a long period of time.  
 
What are the proximate causes of this lackluster performance? If we focus on the 
relatively benign decade of the 1990s, one characteristic that emerges is low investment, which 
averaged barely 15.4 percent for the decade, a full 7.4 percentage points less than would be 
expected based on the country’s income per capita. Was this caused by lack of investible 
resources (low supply of savings) or lack of investment opportunities (low investment demand). 
One answer to this question comes from looking at whether the country had fully used its 
available sources of external savings. This was obviously not the case as the current account 
deficit barely averaged 1.4 percent of GDP for the decade while the country enjoyed an 
investment-grade credit rating. Hence, it had access to relatively cheap sources of finance that it 
decided not to mobilize. We conclude that on the whole the low investment ratio reflected low 
demand for investment.  
 
This means that the risk-adjusted return to physical capital was low. Could this be 
explained by a lack of complementary inputs such as human capital or institutions? Clearly, it 
could not have been human capital. As Figure 4 shows, the country exhibits a rather high level of 
schooling but very low returns to schooling. This is the opposite of what would be expected if 
the country had bumped into a human capital constraint.  
 
                                                 
1 We use Penn World Tables definition of GDP and population.  
2 This reflects the fact that the collapse in 1982-84 was larger than in 2002. Per capita growth from the trough-year 
of 1984 to the peak-year of 1998 was a respectable 3 percent. Obviously, this last measure is questionable as it 










































Neither does Uruguay seem to suffer from inadequate institutions. The country averaged 
a 1.74 index in the Kaufman rule of law indicator. This compares to 0.23 for Argentina, -0.16 for 
Brazil and 0.26 expected for countries of Uruguay’s level of income.  
 
One possible explanation is the instability of the growth environment and in particular of 
the real exchange rate. Figure 5 shows the ranking of 73 countries in terms of the volatility of 
their 5-year real exchange rate in the period between 1980 and 2000. The country appears as the 
8
th most volatile. This increases the risk and lowers investment in the tradable sector for any 
expected level of the real exchange rate
3. In addition, it lowers the expected return of R&D and 
public goods investments in the sector. Thus real exchange rate volatility may explain why so 
many investment opportunities remain unexploited in traditional export areas in Uruguay and 




                                                 
3 Hausmann, Panizza and Rigobon (2004) study the negative two-way relationship between real exchange rate  
volatility and openness.    9













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another explanation, which we will discuss in this report, is the presence of externalities 
in the process of discovering new profitable activities, especially in the tradable sector, a process 
which we refer to as self-discovery. In general, expending resources in the process of finding out 
whether, some activities, after some adaptation to local conditions, can be profitably produced in 
Uruguay is bound to generate information that is valuable to other potential producers, who will 
benefit from these efforts. This means that part of the payoff to self-discovery efforts benefits 
third parties and consequently depresses the market return to these activities.  As a consequence, 
the market will make an inefficiently low effort from a social point of view.  
 
The process of self-discovery will be further disrupted by real appreciation and by real 
exchange rate volatility: the appreciation acts as a general tax as it lowers the expected pay-off 
while the volatility increases the risk of this already perilous activity.  
 
Is the check in the mail?  
 
Macro balance has been largely achieved although not in a fully resilient manner, given 
fiscal and banking weaknesses. Inflation is at single digits and country risk is below 500bp. The 
level of the real exchange rate makes the country quite competitive. There are ample 
underutilized productive assets that can be deployed given a growing world economy and a 
rapidly recovering regional market. In addition, there are clear ideas about areas of profitable 
private investment with large growth potential. The political system is working well and new 
authorities have just been elected. In short, Uruguay is well placed to embark on a process of 
rapid and significant recovery. In some sense, the check of recovery is clearly in the mail.  
 
One question is whether this will be converted this time into sustained growth. Can the 
country improve on its 1 percent long-run rate of growth of per capita GDP? We can offer an 
encouraging metaphor. The current situation of Uruguay is not unrelated to that of Chile in 1984.   10
The country had seen a drop in GDP of 18 percent over the two previous years. The public debt 
exceeded 100 percent of GDP. Savings rates were low. However, starting that year, the country 
embarked on a sustained expansion with growth exceeding 7 percent on average for the 
following 14 years, compared to less than 4 percent for Uruguay in the same period. Growth was 
led by exports, which were quite intensive in Chile’s natural endowment. Savings rates gradually 
increased by over 6 percentage points of GDP and the public debt to GDP ratio declined to less 
than 20 percent of GDP. One major difference between the two countries is that in Chile, the real 
exchange rate depreciation that took place in the context of the 1982 crisis was much more 
sustained than in Uruguay. We conjecture that this allowed the economy to provide greater 
incentives for the development of a globally productive export sector. By contrast, real 
appreciation in Uruguay was related to the pull of an appreciating regional market that proved 
unsustainable.  
 
The future of Uruguay 
 
Can Uruguay change its lackluster and volatile growth path? Will it need to abandon its 
prevailing social compact in order to do so? We think that growth can be accelerated within the 
existing social compact. While the Uruguayan system has involved a more activist state than has 
been fashionable of late, it has been able to generate a solid democracy and public institutions 
that are able to deliver the necessary public goods for the development of new growth activities, 
such as the ones mentioned above. Our strategy is based on leveraging the institutional 
advantages of the country and its political traditions and focusing it in facilitating and 
accelerating productive transformation.   
 
Life is full of surprises and opportunities may arise in unplanned areas. The development 
strategy should be open to this possibility. However, the investment ideas that the market seems 
to be encouraging prefigure a growth path based on natural resource-based industries and niche 
services.  Meat, rice, forestry, pulp and paper, dairy products and software appear well poised for 
sustained expansion. As mentioned above, the potential of each one of these sectors and of others 
such as tourism and financial services is predicated on the provision of key public goods and 
high quality institutions.  
 
Implementing a strategy to accelerate growth inevitably involves interventions at both the 
macro and the micro level. At the micro level, the idea is to make it as easy as possible for 
society to transform its productive structure through the development of growth and investment 
opportunities. This requires addressing informational or coordination problems that arise, 
especially in new activities. Developing the institutional capacity to do this efficiently and 
legitimately is key. The macro level involves the maintenance of a stable and competitive real 
exchange rate, so as to create a stable and encouraging environment for export growth. Without a 
more stable set of relative price expectations, it will be difficult to consolidate the process of 
growth. 
 
In what follows we take up each of these elements of the growth strategy.  We first focus 
on the design of incentive policies for economic diversification and promotion.  We discuss next 
the macroeconomic complements, with special emphasis on maintaining a competitive and stable 
real exchange rate. 
   11
II. Targeting institutional strengths more closely on productive 
transformation 
 
As we have discussed in the preceding section, Uruguay’s institutions are relatively 
effective in the provision of a wide range of public goods.  These public goods—a competent, 
honest bureaucracy, public safety, law and order, health and sanitary standards,  research and 
extension services in some agricultural areas, functioning democratic procedures, social 
cohesion—play an important role in strengthening the country’s traditional areas of comparative 
advantage.  They will also play a key role in defining new areas of comparative advantage and 
diversifying the productive structure.  We believe that these assets can be deployed more 
effectively, both by recognizing their contribution to productive renewal and by understanding 
the requirements of economic diversification.    
   
Why economic transformation requires a proactive government stance 
 
Economic growth is synonymous with the accumulation of productive assets and 
productive capabilities.  Markets play a critical role in the provision of incentives for such 
accumulation.  They generate the profitability signals to which entrepreneurs, investors, 
households, and workers respond.   When such signals are wrong or are diluted—through the 
distortion or repression of markets—the economy cannot live up its potential and economic 
growth remains low.   
 
Markets can malfunction both when governments interfere too much and when they 
interfere too little.  Development policies of the last two decades have been obsessed with the 
first category of policy mistakes—governments’ errors of commission.  Hence the efforts to 
reduce or eliminate regulations, trade restrictions, financial repression, and public ownership.  
Governments’ errors of omission—needed interventions that were not supplied—were de-
emphasized, in part as a reaction to the strong emphasis placed on them by the earlier (and out-
of-fashion) policies of import substitution.  A more balanced strategy has begun to emerge 
recently, as most of the liberalized economies have failed to deliver a satisfactory performance.  
 
The liberal, free-market paradigm of economic development contends that economic 
transformation is best fostered when the government takes a hands-off attitude to the real 
economy and keeps producers at arms’ length.  The historical and empirical record is sharply at 
variance with this view.  Economic success is more often than not the result of collaborative 
private-public strategies.  The role that public support for new industries has played in the 
economic powerhouses of East and Southeast Asia is well known.  But closer to home, the same 
is true also of the comparatively fewer successes that have emerged in Latin America.   See, for 
example, the Table below which lists the top 5 export items of three Latin American countries—
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—to the United States market.  Leaving aside traditional exports, 
practically all of the export successes have been shaped in some part by public policies.  Aircraft 
and steel in Brazil were the subject of explicit industrial policies, through trade restrictions and 
subsidies.  In Chile, grapes and fish were boosted early on by publicly funded R&D and 
dissemination activities, and forestry products have a long history of subsidized plantations.  In 
Mexico, motor vehicles and electronics are the creation of the maquila program and tariff 
preferences granted under the NAFTA.  Scratch the surface of non-traditional export success 
stories, and more often than not you will find industrial policies, public R&D, sectoral supports, 
export subsidies, or preferential tariff arrangements lurking beneath the surface.        12
 
 
Top 5 export items (HS4) to the U.S. (in 2000) 
    
Country Item  Value ($ mil)
Brazil aircraft  1,435
 shoes  1,069
 non-crude  petroleum  689
 steel  485
 chemical  woodpulp  465
    
Chile copper  457
 grapes  396
 fish  377
 lumber  144
 wood  142
    
Mexico motor  vehicles  15,771
 crude  oil  11,977
  computers & peripherals  6,411
  ignition wiring sets  5,576
 trucks  4,853
    
   
  Uruguay is no exception to this.  While the specific stories differ, in most cases, new 
economic activities have been the result of public-private collaboration—of private 
entrepreneurship plus public incentives and support.  Forestry and tourism have benefited from 
generous tax incentives; rice from INIA’s research; beef from publicly run sanitation and 
tracking systems; logistics, banking, software, and call centers from the tax exemptions granted 
in zona francas.  What Uruguay needs is a strategy to render this interaction more systematic and 
more effective.  To develop such a strategy, we require in turn a solid understanding of the 
market failures that block the emergence of new industries and the strengthening of existing ones.  
These are covered in the next two subsections.          
 
a.  Informational externalities and horizontal policies for self-discovery  
 
Markets are pretty good at signaling the profitability of activities that already exist, but 
poor at uncovering the profitability of activities that might exist but do not. Even if these 
activities are not new in the sense that they are present in other, richer economies, they confront 
potential producers with considerable uncertainty as regards costs and productivity under local 
conditions.  Breaking into these new sectors typically requires a pioneer investor, who signals to 
other investors the profitability of these new activities.  We call this process of discovery of the 
underlying cost structure of the economy “self discovery” (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003).      
 
The self discovery process is rife with information externalities because the cost 
information discovered by an entrepreneur cannot be kept private.  If the pioneer is profitable,   13
this can be readily observable by others.  Imitative entry then follows, the incumbent’s rents are 
dissipated, and a new sector takes off.  If, on the other hand, the pioneer firm goes bankrupt, the 
losses are borne in full by the entrepreneur.  Hence entrepreneurship of this kind is not a very 
rewarding economic activity: the losses are private while the gains are socialized.  Consequently 
markets underprovide entrepreneurship in new activities.  But the social benefits of self-
discovery are huge: for a small economy like Uruguay, finding a few products which can be 
profitably produced for world markets can make the difference between prosperity and 
stagnation.  Generating incentives for self discovery should therefore be a key objective of 
economic policy.          
 
During our visit to Uruguay, we did see examples of self-discovery at work.  In 
Zonamerica, we observed several firms operating small, experimental call centers to test whether 
Uruguayan workers had the language and other skills that would make it profitable to invest in 
Uruguay.  Effectively, these firms were in the process of self discovery: they were uncovering 
the true costs of operating in the Uruguayan environment.  If and when they are successful, they 
provide valuable information to other firms and facilitate further investment in this area in 
Uruguay.  A potentially even more significant example is provided by the entry of Tata 
Consultancy Services.  As the minister of finance put it, “Tata is the best advertising for us.”  
Once Tata demonstrates that Uruguay is a profitable location for the provision of software and 
business services, it provides an important demonstration effect to other foreign firms.  A 
somewhat similar process seems to have taken place earlier in banking: Merill Lynch was the 
first big bank to invest in Zonamerica.  Once it came, others followed.   
 
The challenge is to strengthen the process of self discovery by multiplying these 
examples.  We highlight several shortcomings of the Uruguayan policy regime that stand out 
from this perspective.  First, at present, there is no systematic, pro-active strategy of going after 
investments in new areas. Investment promotion remains a passive, ad hoc, idiosyncratic affair. 
Tata for example seems to have come to Uruguay as the result of personal connections and 
chance events.  The Investors’ Attention Office, the one-stop shop for investment incentives, 
does not actively recruit investors; it simply waits for them to come.     
 
Second, while the policy regime in Uruguay is full of investment incentives, as we will 
discuss below, these incentives are not targeted at self-discovery proper.  Most critically, the 
existing regime makes no distinction between pioneer firms and copy cats.  Any investment 
project, regardless of whether it is novel in the Uruguayan context and therefore has the potential 
of generating valuable cost information or not, gets the import duty and income tax exemptions.  
The logic of self-discovery is that it is pioneer investments that provide the valuable information 
externalities.  Therefore it would be desirable to tilt the incentives in favor of truly new activities.  
That means making incentives more generous for new activities, and less so for investments that 
simply expand capacity without generating demonstration effects.   
 
We emphasize that what needs to be subsidized, through tax incentives and other means, 
are new “activities” rather than new “sectors.”  Exporting meat to new markets, the use of a new 
type of pasture, or introducing new cattle breeds, are all forms of “new activities” within the 
existing meat sector that have the potential of providing valuable informational spillovers.  In 
relation to self-discovery, the relevant distinction to be made is not among sectors—with some 
sectors getting better treatment than others—but between activities that are already established   14
within Uruguay and those that are not.   It is experimentation and newness that should be 
subsidized.    
 
It therefore also ought to be clear that this kind of economic policy is not geared towards 
“picking winners,” a common bugaboo.  The motivation behind subsidizing self-discovery is not 
that the government knows something that the private investors do not.  We can safely assume 
that the government is even more ignorant than the private sector about profitable investment 
opportunities.  What the policy relies on is the idea that investments in new activities—all of 
uncertain profitability—are sub-optimal under the plausible assumptions we have discussed 
above.  Since the market under-provides new ventures, the role of the government is to subsidize 
them.  In this, mistakes will surely be made.  Some of the subsidized projects will fail.  But that 
is an unavoidable aspect of the optimal policy.  If costs are uncertain, it must be the case that 
some of the promoted investment will fail.  If there are no or very few mistakes, it is as good an 
indication as any that the promotion did not go far enough!     
 
So the trick is neither to pick winners, nor to avoid mistakes.  It is to avoid prolonging 
mistakes by propping up failing ventures after failure becomes obvious.  This is the “stick” part 
of industrial policy.  Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan accomplished this by closely 
monitoring subsidized activities and withholding support when they failed to perform.  In 
Uruguay, this has been less of an issue in the past for a couple of reasons.  First, the standard-
issue tax incentives are temporary to begin with: they expire in three years, with the amount of 
investment being the maximum tax exemption.  Second, where the incentives are permanent—as 
in the zona francas—firms have to compete in world markets against the most productive firms 
in the world, so that the risk of protecting failures is nil.  On the other hand, we did hear that the 
Corporacion Nacional para el Desarollo (CND) had become a “graveyard” for failed 
enterprises—a far cry from the original intention of making it a joint private-public source of risk 
capital and investment finance. 
 
Therefore, Uruguay’s policies targeted at self-discovery will have to operate on the 
principle that “mistakes will be made, but not prolonged.”  This can be ensured through the 
temporary nature of the incentives, and by monitoring whether firms are performing in terms of 
exports, profitability, and so on. The carrot of incentives has to be combined with the stick of 
taking them away so that resources do not get bottled up in unproductive ventures for long. 
Adopting the principle that incentives be temporary (for examples, through fixed grants for new 
ventures) is perhaps the simplest way to achieve this. 
 
Finally, there are some additional actions that can be pursued to reduce the cost of 
experimentation and discovery. In particular,  public risk capital or venture funds  is a form of 
finance that is particularly well targeted at self-discovery, as it entails risk sharing between the 
entrepreneur and the provider of capital. As mentioned above, the CND has not fulfilled its 
potential promise in this area.  We heard that a new public-private venture fund is being 
organized with IDB support.  It was not clear to us whether the fund is operational or the details 
are still being negotiated.  The fund is supposed to be run as a private entity, and will operate 
around a scale of $10-15 million.   
 
b.  Coordination failures and vertical policies for clusters  
   15
In addition to information spillovers regarding profitable new activities (discussed in the 
previous section), economic development can be retarded by coordination failures that hold back 
investments in activities that are crucial for a sector’s development. This subsection discusses the 
nature of this second type of market failures and the vertical policies that are appropriate to deal 
with them. 
 
A firm’s productivity depends not only on its own actions and general economic 
conditions, but also on the actions of firms and institutions in related sectors. For example, a 
firm’s productivity will be higher when it can benefit from the local production of a wide variety 
of specialized inputs, or when it can draw upon the local supply of high-quality human resources 
specialized to its needs. Productivity also depends on sector-specific infrastructure (e.g., a 
regional airport may be critical for tourism) and regulation (e.g., enforcing quality standards for 
the food sector). Clearly, the market is not a good mechanism to bring about the supply of these 
activities; left by itself, the market could suffer from coordination failures that prevent a sector or 
group of sectors from developing into a high productivity “cluster,” where firms are highly 
productive thanks to the specific environment in which they operate. 
 
Coordination failures can arise in many different circumstances. In some cases, they arise 
because activities entail strong complementarities. Building an airport in a region that has no 
hotels would not lead to any traffic, but hotels without a regional airport may not be profitable 
either. Creating a university specialized in fashion design would not be reasonable in the absence 
of firms demanding such human resources, but firms may not evolve towards fashion design in 
the absence of specialized professionals. In other cases, the problem arises because the supplier 
of an input or service would not capture the full social returns, hence the input or service may not 
become available even when it would be socially profitable to do so. For example, the local 
availability of sterilization services is crucial for the growth of the medical-devices cluster, but 
since its supplier will not be able to extract the full surplus from this service, then it may not be 
offered even though that would be collectively efficient. Finally, strong externalities may imply 
that a certain activity will be underprovided unless the affected agents coordinate to jointly pay 
for or directly deliver the related service. A good example in Uruguay is the case of the cattle 
industry, where the eradication of foot and mouth disease has generated large benefits to the 
industry and the whole economy, yet this clearly required coordinated action that was ultimately 
implemented by the government. 
 
In contrast to the horizontal policies recommended in the previous section, the existence 
of coordination failures leads to the need for vertical policies, where the Government engages in 
actions that are specific to certain sectors (Rodríguez-Clare, 2004a). This introduces the need for 
selectivity, since it would be impossible for the government to engage in this type of action for 
all sectors. This is clear in the case of sector-specific infrastructure (e.g., airports for tourism and 
exports of fresh products, irrigation for agriculture), but also arises in many other instances 
because of the scarcity of the leadership and high-level government resources needed for many 
public interventions. Yet the need for selectivity immediately leads to the controversial debate 
about how to choose sectors for support. There are several points to make in this regard. First, 
most countries already implicitly select certain sectors for special attention. In the case of 
Uruguay, the classic example is the cattle industry, but now export-oriented services (e.g., 
software, call centers) and tourism are among a handful of other sectors to which the government 
devotes special consideration. Second, in contrast to policies pursued in the past, what we are 
advocating here by the name of vertical policies does not entail the distortion of prices to favor   16
one or another sector. The purpose is not to enlarge some sectors that are considered special 
from a certain perspective, but rather to encourage the realization of activities that are socially 
beneficial but that would not be realized without public action or support. In other words, what is 
important is not that the economy specializes in certain “special” sectors, but rather that current 
sectors evolve towards high productivity clusters, a process that requires the resolution of 
coordination failures and hence public interventions aimed at “cluster development.”  
 
Third, there is no accepted economic principle according to which sectors can be chosen 
in an objective and rigorous manner. Even if it were true that coordination failures are more 
intense in technologically-advanced sectors, for example, it would not follow that such sectors 
deserve more support, since their international prices would naturally be lower to reflect the 
extra productivity that arises because of their technological intensity (see Rodríguez-Clare, 
2004b). Thus, the selection of sectors for special cluster-building action cannot be done by 
armchair economists, or by government technocrats. The goal is rather to put together a social 
process that leads to the selection of sectors where public action can make a difference. There is 
always a reasonable concern that such a process would lead to capture and rent seeking, but if 
properly designed to elicit competition among alternative proposals and transparent evaluation 
by respected and reputable individuals, then this may be avoided in certain contexts. As will be 
argued further below, the experience of Uruguay with the Industrial Promotion Law suggests that 
the State can manage discretion without breeding corruption.  
 
Finally, and related to the previous point, the government generally does not have 
detailed knowledge about the most effective cluster-development activities to undertake across 
the economy. Moreover, many of these activities require strong cooperation from the private 
sector. Thus, one of the most important principles in the selection of sectors for cluster-
development activities is the level of organization of the sector-level associations, both for the 
design of interventions, and for the constructive partnership with the government that would be 




One of the most relevant externalities that lead to coordination failures is related to 
innovation. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in support of the hypothesis that innovation 
activities generate significant externalities that benefit firms located in the vicinity of the original 
innovation (see Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). The standard policy to deal with this market 
failure has been to subsidize R&D in public universities and in private corporations, the latter 
usually through tax incentives. Strengthening the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regime has 
been another approach followed recently (in part because of the related agreement in the 
Uruguay Round of GATT). More generally, it has become fashionable to talk about the need to 
strengthen the National Innovation System as a way to promote R&D, innovation and 
development.  
 
While important, these policies are not likely to have a significant effect for several 
reasons. First, tax incentives for R&D undertaken by private corporations are likely to fail in 
developing countries because they would end up subsidizing research that is not likely to 
generate any significant spillovers, as there are likely to be no other firms that are close enough 
in geographic or economic space to benefit from the knowledge generated in the originating firm. 
Second, as documented by Audretsch and Feldman (2003), some kinds of research lead to higher   17
spillovers than others. In particular, research undertaken in universities and research centers on 
behalf of industry groups is likely to generate much higher spillovers than R&D performed in 
private corporations. Thus, instead of simply subsidizing R&D across the board, policy should 
aim to promote collaborative research where several firms can benefit. A successful example of 
this approach in Uruguay are the “Mesas de Trabajo,” which are virtual organizations that bring 
together most of the firms of a sector (e.g., barley, rice, wine, citrus, forestry) with research 
centers to canalize public and private funds towards research in areas defined as critical to the 
sector. Third, most of the policies mentioned above can be seen as supporting the supply side of 
the R&D market, but leave aside the demand side, which may actually be the main constraint in 
developing countries. In other words, the real constraint on innovation may be the lack of 
profitability perceived by entrepreneurs in implementing innovations, rather than the supply of 
innovations per se. It could be argued that – by increasing the private gains from innovation – 
strengthening the IPR regime could help in this regard, but in small LDCs this is likely to have 
an insignificant effect, since the local markets protected by patents are small. 
 
In line with our arguments about the importance of cluster-development policies, we 
believe that – instead of general innovation policies like the ones just mentioned – policy should 
aim at promoting collaborative innovation activities in potential clusters chosen for special 
support. A good example of this is offered by the experience of collaboration between the private 
rice sector and INIA (Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria), an institute for 
agricultural research created by law in 1990. (Although INIA is a public institution, it operates 
outside the sphere of the State, giving it much more flexibility.) During the 1990s, INIA 
developed new rice seeds that are better adapted to Uruguay’s soil and climatic conditions, 
allowing productivity and exports to grow at a dramatic pace: in the year 2000, productivity 
reached 6,400 kilograms per hectare, one of the highest in the world, with 96% of the seed used 
being of national origin. Today, INIA’s rice program, which takes place in experimental stations 
in several parts of the country, includes studies to identify and treat plagues (biotechnology), 
improving irrigation systems and planting methods, and the continuous evaluation of pesticides 
and fertilizers. Many of these projects take place with close interaction and collaboration with 
Uruguayan and regional universities, and always with strong coordination with private sector 
associations.  
 
The rice program at INIA offers an interesting model for vertical policies aiming at the 
development of “innovation clusters” in other sectors. Ideally, the private sector should be 
organized in a manner that is not designed to elicit favors or lobby for protection, but rather to 
work together with the government in a constructive manner. When such organizations exist, 
government and sector organizations should jointly design a cluster-development strategy for the 
sector, focusing on issues that require coordination, and placing innovation activities as top 
priorities. The details of such a strategy are of course dependent on the specific circumstances, 
but there are some general principles that apply in all cases. First, it is hard to imagine the sector 
organization being strong enough (in terms of its ability to solve free-rider problems) to be able 
to internalize all the relevant spillovers that are likely to arise from a research program. 
Government grants to pay for part (never the whole amount) of the cost of such programs are 
then essential to stimulate demand. Second, the ability of the “supply side” to respond to an 
organized sector’s demand for research differs greatly across countries and across sectors within 
countries. Strengthening a country’s higher-education system and its ability to respond to 
requests for research would be a clear priority for some countries. Fortunately, thanks to many 
decades of investment in its universities, Uruguay can now focus on more specific policies, such   18
as strengthening research capabilities in certain key areas (e.g., informatics, biotechnology) and 
improving the incentives of individual researchers and research centers within universities. This 
last point entails (at the very least) allowing university research centers to retain most of the 
income obtained from research projects with the private sector, transferring part of that income 
to individual researchers as extra compensation, clarifying the rules to deal with intellectual 
property generated in the course of the research so that rents are shared with centers and 
researchers involved, and allowing researchers flexibility to leave the university for brief periods 
of time to pursue commercial opportunities associated with their research. 
 
Another key issue here relates to the availability of specialized human resources. The 
way markets operate in LDCs (and even in DCs) is not effective in making the supply of human 
resources respond to demand. This is because there are many steps in taking the “signal” of an 
increase in demand for a particular kind of human resources (e.g., software engineers) to the 
people that make decisions regarding the allocation of education resources (i.e., students, and 
education providers). Moreover, several steps in the process are occupied by public organizations 
without appropriate incentives. And even when they are occupied by private, profit-seeking 
organizations, the information about the quality of their service is difficult to transmit to their 
customers (although with international certification, this is now becoming less of a problem). 
The point is then that the provision of specialized human resources requires special attention and 
collaboration between private industry groups and research centers and universities, not only to 
jointly design the curricula, but to work together on issues such as provision of modern 




In general, as argued above, the government does not need to engage in the a priori 
selection of some sectors for special support, but rather institute a competitive process whereby 
certain sector strategies will be selected and supported. There are some cases, however, where a 
priori selection of sectors does seem to make sense. For example, it seems clear that Uruguay 
has ample investment opportunities in tourism beyond what has already been done in Punta del 
Este, but this sector’s development requires strong public investment and support. There are also 
clear opportunities for business development related to logistics and port services for 
MERCOSUR trade that also require public investments. To a certain extent, these are cases that 
lie in an area of intersection between horizontal policies to induce discovery and vertical policies 
to deal with coordination failures. This is because discovery in these cases requires strong 
collective action, so subsidies for private investment are not enough; in particular, there is a need 
for public policies and investment to allow the new activities to develop. 
 
Implications for policy and institutional arrangements  
 
Industrial policies are pervasive in Uruguay.  There are tax incentives (both generalized 
and tailored to specific sectors), import duty exemptions, free zones, public support for R&D, 
and other forms of support.  When we evaluate the Uruguayan system of promotion from the 
perspective of the requirements discussed above, we find that it has a number of virtues.  Chief 
among the system’s virtues is that it has been effective in promoting certain areas (forestry, rice, 
tourism), without generating corruption and rent seeking.  The bureaucracy is competent and 
autonomous, when viewed in comparative perspective.  Uruguay is an interesting illustration that 
effective industrial policies are not the province of “hard” East Asian states alone.  An additional   19
virtue of the system is that incentives do not discriminate between domestic and foreign investors.  
Uruguay has thus far avoided the mistake of bifurcating its investment regime between foreign 
and domestic investors.  This ensures that domestic investors can partake of the benefits of legal 
and institutional improvements that are aimed at attracting foreign investment.     
 
On the other hand, the promotion system in Uruguay also has many defects.  It remains 
on the whole passive and reactive (except in a few areas, such as tourism where the minister has 
taken an active role).  The incentives are too generous for some activities (non-new activities 
with limited cluster potential) and too stingy in other areas.  They are not well targeted on the 
information and coordination externalities discussed above.  They are not well coordinated.  
They are not based on performance standards.  They tend to employ a restricted range of 
instruments, mainly tax incentives, tariff exemptions, and free zones.   
 
The Uruguayan approach lacks a unifying, politically salient “vision.”  A concrete 
indicator of this is that there is no high-ranking political official (say a government minister) who 
views investment promotion to be his primary objective.  No one feels accountable for the low 
level of private investment in the country—in the same manner that the Central Bank feels 
accountable for inflation or the finance minister feels accountable for debt dynamics.  Yet 
investment is as much a product of the policy environment as inflation and public finances are.            
 
In the following we enumerate the main elements of the prevailing promotion regime in 
Uruguay, and discuss their strong and weak points. 
 
The industrial promotion legislation 
  
  Uruguay has a general investment promotion law, last revised in 1998, that applies across 
the board, as well as sectoral promotion legislation for forestry, tourism, autos, and software.  
The 1998 law provides investments with exemptions from import duties on capital goods, 
income tax and wealth tax for several years.  These incentives do not seem to be targeted in any 
particular way, and the law itself defines the objectives of investment promotion in very broad 
ways: exports of non-traditional products, exploitation of domestic raw materials, employment, 
and increased productivity.  In practice, virtually any project that includes purchase of capital 
goods seems to qualify.        
 
The process for receiving the incentives has recently been streamlined with the creation 
of an Investor’s Attention Office, which works as a one-stop shop and shepherds the application 
for incentives through the inter-ministerial process.  The process operates with a presumption 
that the incentives will be granted: the Investor’s Attention Office has 180 days within which to 
reject a proposal.  We were told that all applications are approved provided they comply with the 
checklist of requirements—which seems to be the case in virtually all cases.  There is little 
selectivity and discretion in the system.  Curiously, the Investor’s Attention Office runs out of 
the Ministry of Tourism, where it seems to get little attention and priority.            
 
  Pro:  The regime generates incentives for new investments, runs efficiently and smoothly, 
and without apparent corruption or rent-seeking.   
 
  Con:  This is an entirely passive system.  The Investors’ Attention Office just waits for 
proposals to come in; it does not actively search or solicit investors.  Its location in the   20
Tourism Ministry militates against it playing a central coordinating role for investment 
promotion across all sector.  The system is too generous for investments of certain types: 
for example, those in nontradable sectors with few plausible demonstration effects
4; 
investments that do not represent new activities; investments that would most likely have 
taken place anyhow.  It is possibly not generous enough for new activities in tradable 
sectors with potentially large demonstration effects.  For example, since the exemption 
from profit taxation applies for a limited number of years it can be of limited benefit in 
the early stages of an investment when profits are low or negative.  While non-selectivity 
and the absence of discretion can be a virtue at times, in this case it seems to us to have 
been taken too far.  Targeting the investment promotion legislation more directly on 
information and coordination externalities will inevitably require a greater degree of 
discretion and selectivity in its application.  That in turn requires strengthening the inter-




Uruguay has a very liberal regime of free zones, which allows tax and duty free operation 
to all types of firms, including those in services.  In addition, firms in free zones have access to 
privately supplied energy and telecommunication services, unlike most non-zone firms.  The 
only taxes paid by employers are the social security contributions for Uruguayan personnel.  One 
notable feature of these zones is that they grant exemption from not only current but also any 
future taxes that may be imposed in Uruguay (within the contract period).  They therefore 
provide greater security than the investment promotion law.  This is one reason why recent large 
investments by Spanish and Finnish firms in pulp and paper have sought the protection of free 
zone status. 
 
The free zones were originally intended to export manufactures to Mercosur markets.  
However, the Mercosur decision not to allow tax-free entry to goods manufactured in Uruguayan 
free zones (a privilege granted only to Tierra del Fuego in Argentina and Manaus in Brazil) 
dissipated interest in these zones for manufacturing purposes.  Their subsequent growth has 
relied on services such as port and logistics services, financial services, call centers, and 
software.
5  The largest of these zones (Zonamerica) employs about 2000 people, which is 
indicative of the limited gains that the zones have so far generated.  Since 1999, two privately-
owned free zones were found to operate with irregularities (in particular, smuggling) and were 
closed or taken over by the state.  This last is important, since it demonstrates the ability of the 
Uruguayan state to wield the stick and remove incentives when necessary.        
 
                                                 
4 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Commercial Guide on Uruguay, “To date, the largest promoted 
project was a remodeling of Montevideo’s horseracing stadium submitted by Hípica Rioplatense Uruguay. The 
project, which was opened to the public at end-2003, cost US$21.2m. The company—made up of Argentinian and 
US investors—was allowed to import equipment worth US$1.2m duty free. Goods and services worth US$15.7m 
are exempt from the industry and commerce income tax for five years and all intangible goods and fixed assets 
involved in the project are tax exempt for five years. 
 
5 Under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Zona Francas are seen as export 
subsidies and thereby are scheduled for elimination in 2009 by all developing countries with income per capita 
levels above $1,000. This agreement applies only to manufactures, however, so this does not present a problem for 
Uruguay given that in practice the regime has specialized in services.   21
  Pro: The zones provide greater contractual security to investors and allow them to evade 
the public monopolies in telecom and energy.  As such, they offer a good environment 
for self-discovery, as is already happening to some extent in software and call centers.   
  
  Con: In view of the tax free status of the free zones, this is an arrangement that cannot be 
scaled up.  In addition, the zones necessarily provide limited spillovers and linkages with 
the rest of the economy.  Consequently, they cannot be the engine of transformation for 
entire Uruguayan economy. 
 
In view of these considerations, one interesting possibility to explore that would be less 
costly, more scalable and better targeted to discovery than the current Zona Franca regime, is to 
offer “investment contracts” to projects in new activities. These contracts would specify the taxes 
that apply to the project for a period of time, say 15 years, but would not offer full tax 
exemptions. Thus, just as Zonas Francas, these contracts would offer security to prospective 
investors, but at a lower cost. Given that other countries are likely to keep their Zona Franca 
incentives for services, however, it would probably be necessary to set the tax rates for 
investments in services at lower rates than for the whole economy. Still, it doesn’t seem possible 
or necessary for Uruguay to do away completely with corporate income taxes for services. 
Perhaps tax rates of the order of 10-15% are competitive and sustainable if applied for a period 
of 10-15 years. One additional advantage of this system is that, in contrast to the Zona Franca 
regime, investment contracts would not limit linkages and spillovers between supported 




  MERCOSUR has to be considered an important part of the industrial promotion arsenal 
in Uruguay.  It gives Uruguayan producers duty and quota free market access (with some 
exceptions, notably in autos) to two large neighboring markets, Argentina and Brazil. These 
preferences were in all likelihood an important reason for the reasonable rate of growth 
experienced by Uruguay’s economy during much of the 1990s.  At the same time, while the 
common external tariff remains too high for many economists’ tastes, MERCOSUR was also 
probably critical in lowering Uruguay’s own barriers to trade during this period.  We heard many 
complaints about the height of external tariffs, but it is unclear if the Uruguayan polity would 
have supported an even larger reduction on its own. 
 
  The instability in Argentina and Brazil remains a big concern.  The increasing integration 
of Uruguay with these economies during the 1990s probably aggravated the costs of the shocks 
emanating from these countries after 1998 (the Brazilian devaluation and the Argentine collapse).  
There is widespread worry that market access to Brazil and Argentina remains uncertain, and 
subject to capricious policies at the border.  A view that we heard expressed often is that 
membership in Mercosur prevents Uruguay from cutting a separate Free Trade Agreement deal 
with the US—the way that Chile has done.  However, we think the most significant cost of 
MERCOSUR has to do with the volatility imported from Argentina (and to a lesser extent 
Brazil). As we shall discuss in the section on the real exchange rate, MERCOSUR -related 
volatility generates instability and uncertainty in the profitability of activities directed not just to 
MERCOSUR, but also to the rest of the world.  So instability in Mercosur acts as a tax on 
investments across the board. 
   22
  Pro: For a country as small as Uruguay, trade integration with large neighboring countries 
such as Argentina and Brazil is likely to bring about important gains due to specialization 
and economies of scale, as well as incentives for discovery in regional activities that offer 
significant opportunities for increased productivity and growth. 
  Con: Argentina and Brazil are both prone to episodes of real exchange-rate appreciation, 
so increased trade specialization with these countries is likely to result in lower risk-
adjusted profitability in tradable activities that depend on exports to the rest of the world. 
The result would be a reduction in exploration and self-discovery.   
     
Public funding of R&D and technology transfer  
 
  Thanks to decades of investment in higher education, Uruguay now enjoys a good 
position in terms of its basic capabilities in science and technology. It has an important group of 
researchers and research centers in several areas of economic importance, and high-quality 
universities capable of producing specialized human resources with research capacities. 
Researchers have a good track record in terms of publications and citations in international 
journals. Different Administrations over the last decades have generally paid important attention 
to science and technology policy. There are laws that establish the competence of different 
ministries (the Ministry of Education and Culture is in charge of defining policies, while the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy is in charge of regulation regarding norms and standards and 
distribution of research funds), a well defined and modern system for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, and laws defining the system of norms and standards. There are 
several agencies in charge of different areas of the National Innovation System, the most 
important of which are DINACYT (Dirección Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología), which 
supervises the operation of the whole system, LATU (Laboratorio Tecnológico del Uruguay), 
whose goal is to transfer technology to the private sector, and INIA, which is in charge of 
conducting research for the agricultural sector.
6 
 
Over the last decade, the country has been improving this system through two broad 
Science and Technology programs financed through loans from the IADB. The first program 
focused mostly on strengthening the supply side, i.e. the capabilities of the research community 
to engage in projects that are relevant for improving the competitiveness of the Uruguayan 
economy. It was then recognized that the main weakness of the system is the lack of links 
between the supply and demand sides. This became the main focus of the second program, 
Programa de Desarrollo Tecnológico (PDT), which is currently under execution and supervised 
by DINACYT. Indeed, the most important component of this program is the distribution of 
grants to single firms and groups of firms to finance up to 50% of the cost of research projects. 
To a large extent, this systematizes the successful experience of the “mesas de trabajo” 
mentioned earlier, where research centers and groups of firms get together to define research 
agendas addressing a sector’s main issues.
7 
                                                 
6 Readers interested in getting a more complete picture of the NIS in Uruguay can consult 
http://www.dinacyt.gub.uy.  
7 The PDT has three components. The first component is the one already mentioned; it entails the distribution of 
funds to individual enterprises or groups of firms for the financing of research. The second component is directed to 
strengthening the country’s capabilities in research (i.e., the research supply side). The third component directs 
funds to improve the effectiveness of the whole innovation system, and mainly entails strengthening DINACYT. In 
contrast to previous efforts, one key element in allocating funds for the research community under the second 
component is the economic relevance of the research. To implement this, a committee is in charge of defining “areas 
of opportunity” which research could generate larger social returns.    23
 
 
                                                
There are several other initiatives currently in progress. One that is particularly 
interesting is an agreement between Chile and the countries of MERCOSUR with France to 
create the Cooperation Network AMSUD-Pasteur. The goal of this network is to create a 
development pole in the region anchored in biology, biomedicine and biotechnology. This will 
be done through the integration of universities and research institutes of the member countries to 
undertake joint research projects, interchange of students and teachers, joint academic programs, 
etc. There is a clear orientation towards research that is relevant for the industries in the region 
and for other needs such as public health and the environment.
8 
 
  Pro: Thanks to decades of investment and recent efforts, Uruguay now has an advanced 
higher education system and a good group of research centers and institutions that 
perform high-quality research. In other words, it has a well developed “research supply 
side.” Given Uruguay’s stage of development, this can be turned into one key element in 
the country’s future growth. 
 
  Con: Although there are some examples of collaboration with the private sector (e.g., 
INIA, “mesas de trabajo,” current emphasis in the PDT) the links between the supply and 
demand sides of research within the National Innovation System remain weak. Although 
the PDT is trying to address this weakness, the program is moving slowly due to the 
country’s fiscal problems.  
 
Vertical policies and specific initiatives (tourism, ports)  
 
Although most of Uruguay’s microeconomic policies do not discriminate across sectors 
(e.g., zona francas, investment incentives), there are some vertical policies in place. There is a 
strong policy to promote growth in agriculture, a specific agenda to promote software and ICT, 
an ambitious tourism development strategy, and a strategy to develop a modern logistics center 
in Montevideo by leveraging its geographic advantages. 
 
Uruguay’s agricultural policy has been clearly successful. It currently enjoys high levels 
of productivity, has good research capabilities, and also strong links between research 
institutions and the private sector. It also has well-developed public institutions capable of 
undertaking detailed regulations of the kind that have allowed the cattle sector to gain access to 
the U.S. market.  Regarding ICT policy, there are special tax incentives for companies investing 
in ICT equipment and for software producers, as well as several other initiatives such as an 
incubator for firms in ICT, a joint project between LATU and Universidad ORT Uruguay (the 
most important private university in the country), with financial support from InfoDev (World 
Bank). This last initiative may be seen as a way of promoting discovery that may be especially 
effective in the context of ICT. 
 
The country is currently engaged in an aggressive policy to expand tourism beyond its 
traditional poles in Punta del Este and Montevideo. The Ministry of Tourism (created by law in 
1986) has an ambitious vision and plan for the sector’s development that includes promotion 
abroad (with the new slogan, Uruguay Natural), preservation of historical and cultural sites, 
incentives and improved regulation to attract more air traffic (to benefit from European tourists 
visiting Brazil and Argentina), infrastructure investments in attraction areas in the interior (along 
 
8 Interested readers can consult http://amsudpasteur.edu.uy/.    24
the Uruguay River towards the North of the country, and in some areas near the border with 
Brazil), and incentives for private investments in hotels. 
 
Another clear opportunity lies in turning Uruguay into a regional hub for the provision of 
services and logistics for MERCOSUR, a common market of 229 million people accounting for 
80 percent of South America’s GDP. The country has several advantages that position it very 
favorably in this regard. First, it has a central location, with 80 percent of MERCOSUR output 
and consumption taking place within a 2000 km radius from Montevideo.
9 Second, the currents 
from the Uruguay River flow in such a way that sediment is accumulated on the Argentinean 
side, leaving the Montevideo harbor with much better conditions. Third, port services were 
privatized in 1992, allowing efficiency to improve and reach levels that are among the highest in 
the region. Fourth, business friendly regulation, with fully digitalized telecommunications 
infrastructure and an open and modern financial system. Fifth, Uruguayan institutions have 
shown their strength and credibility throughout the last financial crisis, making it an ideal 
location for regional service providers such as banks, insurance companies, warehousing and 
distribution services, etc. Finally, a system of incentives is already in place, under the Free Port 
and Free Zone laws, making it easier for the country to compete in the attraction of some of these 
companies. 
 
Taking advantage of this opportunity requires strong government intervention in planning, 
regulation, and promotion. Just as with many other infrastructure projects, such as roads and 
airports, the building or expansion of a port requires careful planning to ensure that its design 
maximizes development opportunities for the region. This is even more relevant in cases such as 
Montevideo, where the port is a critical element of the region’s development strategy. The 
planning that we have in mind is not traditional planning, which entailed coordination of 
investments executed by the State with little interaction with the private sector, but rather a form 
of indicative planning for investments executed by the private sector with the goal of maximizing 
synergies across different activities. (In fact, this is the modern approach to the design of port 
infrastructure projects.) Besides planning, the successful development of a cluster of activities 
around a port in Montevideo requires regulation to deal with the clear market power inevitably 
retained by some of the port-services providers, and promotion (and perhaps more aggressive 
incentives) to attract investments (most likely foreign investment) in key activities for the 
development of this cluster. 
 
•  Pro: The country has a demonstrated capacity to accomplish complicated public-private 
cooperative ventures. Moreover, there are several non-traditional sectors such as ICT, 
tourism, and logistics that seem to offer great opportunities for investment and growth, 
provided there is joint action to promote clustering, invest in public goods and engage in 
other coordinated strategies. 
•  Con: The main problem with Uruguay’s approach to vertical policy is that it is not 
systematic. Instead, it appears to be the product of history (in the case of agriculture) and 
chance. On the positive side, we can say that Uruguay has a “responsive government” 
that reacts positively to clear opportunities for collective action. But clearly Uruguay can 
do better: as discussed below, the government can be more proactive and put together a 
process that elicits proposals for vertical policies from private organizations that would 
                                                 
9 http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy/2002/english/inversiones/directorio/centro.html   25
compete for government grants and attention. This would yield a more aggressive yet 




It is important to think of industrial policy as a process of self-discovery in the broader 
sense.  The right image to carry in one’s head is not of omniscient planners who can intervene 
with the first-best Pigovian taxes to eliminate any and all distortions, but of an interactive 
process of strategic cooperation between the private and public sectors which, on the one hand, 
serves to elicit information on business opportunities and constraints and, on the other hand, 
generates policy initiatives in response (Rodrik 2004).  It is impossible to specify the results of 
such a process ex ante: the point is to discover where action is needed and what type of action 
can bring forth the greatest response.  It is pointless to obsess about policy instruments and 
modalities of interventions.  What is most important to have a process in place which reveals 
areas of desirable interventions.     
 
Tourism strikes us as an area where such a process has been in place, thanks in large part 
to the efforts of the minister of tourism.  Minister Bordaberry outlined to us an elaborate strategy 
for expanding the tourism industry in Uruguay, which has traditionally been based on seasonal 
visits from Argentineans.  The strategy involves efforts on multiple fronts to diversify the source 
countries and tourist destinations in Uruguay.  It requires the minister to play the roles of 
coordinator, cajoler, subsidizer, promoter, advocate, and many others.  Tourism therefore 
emerged as one sector where a “business plan” seemed to be in existence.  The challenge for 
Uruguay is to institutionalize and regularize this kind of effort, which at present depends on the 
initiatives of individuals, and to do so not just in tourism, but for new activities across the board.   
 
The manner in which this should be done is not clear.  One option would be to strengthen 
the interministerial process that currently exists for the approval of investment projects under the 
investment promotion law.  At present, this appears to be a technocratic committee with little 
political salience and no influence over broad economic strategies.  This could be reconstituted 
into a true ministerial committee, with the ministers of finance, planning, tourism, industry, and 
agriculture (and possibly others) as permanent members.  The committee would have to be 
headed by a strong political leader, one with the ear of the president.  Ideally, this would be the 
person who would view investment promotion in Uruguay to be his main priority.  He would 
articulate a vision and a strategy and do it in a way that resonates with the general public.  That 
person could be, for example, the vice president or even the president himself.  Since the 
committee would employ discretion and selectivity, in the manner discussed previously, it needs 
to be politically accountable.  That is best achieved by putting a high-ranking political principal 
in charge of it.   
 
Since an important part of the ministerial committee’s work is to engage in self-discovery, 
in the broad sense of the term, it needs to be in close contact with the private sector.  We do not 
have specific ideas about the manner in which this is best accomplished.  During our visit to 
Uruguay we did not explore the organization of the private sector, and we are agnostic about the 
extent to which existing chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture can be used for this 
purpose.  The one point we want to stress is the importance of what the sociologist Peter Evans 
has called “embedded autonomy”—the need for the governmental process to be autonomous 
from, yet embedded in, the private sector’s decision making.  The policy process needs to be   26
close enough to the private sector that the latter’s opportunities and constraints fully inform 
policy initiatives; yet it has to be distant enough from it that policies are not captured by rent-
seeking interests.  Uruguay’s recent experience leaves us optimistic about the polity’s ability to 
pull this challenge off.      
 
As we have already indicated, one area where we would hope this greater discretion and 
selectivity would be put to use is in targeting the investment promotion activities more closely on 
the information and coordination externalities discussed previously.  Strengthening the incentive 
system would involve targeting tax incentives more closely on new activities and on investments 
with cluster potential.  The resources saved could then be used to increase the generosity of 
appropriately targeted incentives, to increase funding of public R&D through INIA and other 
agencies, and to expand existing initiatives in risk capital and private-public venture funds. 
 
 As we mentioned above, Uruguay already has an extensive industrial promotion system.  
What we are proposing is to improve this system by targeting it more effectively on market 
failures, raising its profile, “politicizing” it in a manner that is appropriate and desirable, raising 
its ambitions, and making it take more risks.  What we have seen of the system indicates that it 
can support these extensions.  We are aware that a more ambitious system will make more 
mistakes.  But it is the very nature of self-discovery, and of the requisite experimentation that 
goes with it, that if mistakes are not made, the system is falling short.     
 
III. Ensuring competitiveness in the medium term: the role of the real 
exchange rate  
 
A recurring feature of Uruguayan economic landscape since the 1970s has been a real 
exchange rate cycle associated with the ups and downs of economic growth.  The pickup in 
growth after 1970s was accompanied by a sharp real appreciation into the early 1980s.  The 
collapse in growth in 1982 was followed quickly with a collapse in the exchange rate.  The 1990s 
replayed this experience.  The increase in growth in the 1990s was accompanied by a significant 
real effective appreciation.  After 1998, growth came to an end, and the exchange rate collapsed 
in 2002 (see Figure 6).  In both episodes, growth was accompanied by a loss in the 
competitiveness of tradables. The counterweights were demand factors: growth was domestic-
demand led (and capital-inflow financed) in the 1970s and Mercosur-led (and also capital-inflow 
financed) in the 1990s.          
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Compare this experience with Chile’s since the mid-1980s.  Chile was able to sustain its 
real exchange rate depreciation following the financial crisis of 1982-83 well into the late 1990s.  
As of 2002, its currency remained significantly more competitive than it had been in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (see Figure 7).  In Uruguay, by contrast, the gain in competitiveness had 
almost all been given up by 2001 due to the real appreciation of the 1990s.  This contrast 
between Uruguay and Chile illustrates an important empirical regularity: growth take-offs take 
place in the context of sustained real exchange rate depreciations and are associated with 
sustained export growth (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2004).   
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  It is important to inquire about what causes the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The common intuition is that as aggregate demand increases, it raises the demand both for 
tradables and non-tradables. However, the demand for tradables can be elastically supplied 
through imports, while non-tradables need to be produced domestically. If there are fixed factors 
in the production of non-tradables – such as fixed capital or land – then increased supply will 
require a rise in the relative price of non-tradables. The opposite happens when aggregate 
demand collapses. Now, Chile’s aggregate demand increased faster than Uruguay’s and for much 
of the 1990s Chile ran a larger current account deficit. Why did this not generate an even faster 
real appreciation in Chile?  
 
 
                                                
One explanation has to do with the sources of demand for “non-tradables”
10 in Uruguay, 
as opposed to Chile. Uruguay is a country that is deeply integrated into the Argentine economy. 
A rise in Argentine demand will spill over into demand for goods and services in Uruguay. 
Tourism is a case in point, but so are services in general. As a consequence, major fluctuations in 
economic activity in Argentina will drive changes in the demand for these “non-tradables” in 
Uruguay. This can be seen by graphing the real exchange rate of Uruguay and Argentine GDP 
(Figure 8). The graph shows an impressive covariance between these two variables. Between 
1983 and 1990, Uruguay’s RER remained at depreciated levels with no signs of appreciation. 
However, with the stabilization of the Argentine economy and the growth and appreciation 




10 We put “non-tradables” in quotations because we refer to activities that cannot be imported or exported, such as 
construction and services, but that due to that can be sold in Uruguay to Argentineans.    29
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In this respect, one hypothesis is that Uruguay suffers from a peculiar form of Dutch 
Disease. Instead of having a volatile petroleum sector which causes movements in aggregate 
demand that affect the real exchange rate, these fluctuations come from Argentine demand for 
goods that would otherwise only be sold in the local market. This logic is also consistent with a 




The Dutch Disease and the concavity of the production possibility frontier 
 
It has been common to assume that an improvement in the terms of trade, or in Argentine 
demand, necessarily leads to real appreciation. However, it is important to understand what lies 
behind this connection. To shed some light on this issue, we will start with a benchmark model 
in which this is not the case. 
 
Assume that both tradables and non-tradables are produced with capital and labor with a 
constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technology. Assume further that capital is perfectly mobile 
internationally. Obviously, this assumption implies that this benchmark should be considered 
relevant only for the medium term, when capital has had the time to adjust to the level that would 
equalize domestic and international returns. Under these assumptions the real exchange rate is 
                                                 
11 See for example, Lorenzo, F., Noya, N., Daude, C., 2001. Tipos de Cambio Reales Bilaterales  y Volatilidad: La 
Experiencia Uruguaya con los Socios del MERCOSUR, in J.M. Fanelli (ed.) Coordinación de Políticas 
Macroeconómicas en el MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI. 
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not affected by shifts in demand because the supply of non-tradables is infinitely elastic and the 
Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF) is flat. An increase in the demand for non-tradables 
would be accommodated by getting more workers from the tradable sector and more capital from 
abroad. Since the technology is CRS, this implies no increase in marginal costs and hence in 
relative price. The economy adjusts through changes in the composition of output without 
changes in relative prices.  
 
  In this medium-term framework, the real exchange rate should move very little unless 
there are large differential technology shifts between tradables and non-tradables, which would 
shift the slope of the PPF. Shocks to the terms of trade would not affect the real exchange rate, 
only the composition of output.  
 
The idea that shocks to the terms of trade leads to real appreciation is predicated on the 
idea that factors of production – international capital and domestic labor in this case – move 
slowly to adjust to shocks. However, in this case, fluctuations of the RER would be temporary 
and the RER would return to its long-run equilibrium level once the adjustment has taken place, 
independently of the terms of trade.  
 
  But we know that the low-frequency (5-year) real exchange rate in Uruguay is very 
volatile, even by the standards of developing countries as shown in Figure 5. The obvious 
question is what is missing from the benchmark model that can account for this low-frequency 
volatility? One element would be fixed factors. If besides capital (which can be moved and 
accumulated) and labor there is another factor whose supply is fixed or quasi-fixed, such as land, 
air, fresh water, etc., this will make the PPF concave. Movements along the PPF now require 
changes in the RER. An increase in the production of non-tradables will require an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (RER). In addition, changes in the RER will not only shift production, 
but also affect the composition of demand: a real appreciation will shift demand away from non-
tradables, thus facilitating the return to balance in the market for non-tradables. 
 
  Data shows that developing countries have on average an RER which is about 2.5 times 
more volatile than that of industrial countries. Shocks to this volatility are also much more 
persistent (Hausmann, Panizza and Rigobon, 2004a). The cause of this is still unclear. Obviously, 
the greater reliance on natural resources might explain the presence of decreasing returns and 
hence a more concave PPF. However, since natural-resource-intensive sectors tend to be capital 
intensive and tradable, while generating little employment, it is unlikely that they would create 
much concavity in the aggregate PPF.   
 
  An alternative hypothesis is that something makes capital less mobile in developing 
countries. Hausmann, Panizza and Rigobon (2004b)  propose such a model. They assume that 
there is some financial or investment imperfection that causes investors to behave as if they were 
more risk averse. The idea is predicated on the notion that in a world of complete markets, risk-
averse individuals would behave as if they were risk neutral because they would be able to hedge 
any undesired risk. They conjecture that the more incomplete the market, the more behavior will 
be affected by risk aversion.  
   31
This assumption introduces an interesting and perverse dynamic. The more volatile the 
RER, the riskier it is to invest, especially in tradables.
12 If there is risk aversion, this will imply a 
higher required expected return and a lower level of investment in tradables. This makes the 
economy more closed.  
 
Now, most open-economy macro models have the property that the more closed the 
economy, i.e. the smaller the tradable sector, the bigger the required shift in the RER for any 
given shock (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003). These two forces constitute a positive feedback 
or multiplier which may trap the economy in a vicious circle in which the RER is volatile 
because the economy is closed, but the economy is closed because the volatility in the RER 
makes it too risky to invest in tradables. In a dynamic setting this makes the stock of capital less 
responsive to real shocks and consequently the real exchange rate must do more of the 
adjustment, meaning that it needs to be more volatile.  
 
Hence, the volatility of the real exchange rate in Uruguay may be part of a more serious 
ailment. The country may be trapped in a bad equilibrium in which investors are reticent to 
invest in clear opportunities in the tradable sector because they fear that the exchange rate may 
move so as to make the investment unprofitable. This causes the tradable sector to be relatively 
small and concentrated in activities where economic rents, arising from natural resources, 
provide a cushion that allows them to survive RER fluctuations. This may explain why in our 
recent visit to Uruguay we found so many investment ideas in tradables that could be harvested 
at the current RER.  
 
In this framework, we can distinguish between first-best and second-best policies. The 
former involve interventions that complete the financial and investment markets so that investors 
behavior becomes less risk averse. Second best policies involve transferring the risk faced by the 
tradable sector to the rest of society. By so doing, investment in tradables would go up and the 
volatility of the real exchange rate would decline, an externality that private investors fail to take 
into account. We shall come back to policy recommendations below, but before we would like to 
delve deeper on the connection between the RER and growth.  
 
The level of the real exchange rate and the growth process 
 
  The level and volatility of the RER affect growth in several ways. Obviously, a stable and 
predictable macro environment will facilitate a smoother functioning of the economy and make 
investment and growth easier. This is conventional, but may understate the importance of the 
effect because it does not make it interact with sources long-run growth.  
 
 
                                                
Clearly, a sharp increase in the relative profitability of tradables is an important 
contributor to igniting and sustaining growth.  We are already seeing  increased investment 
activity in Uruguay’s tradables subsequent to the 2002 depreciation.  The question is whether 
this will be sustained.  In Uruguay’s previous growth cycles, the eventual appreciation of the real 
 
12 Profits in tradables are more sensitive to real exchange rate fluctuations because RER appreciations (depreciations)  
imply a falling (rising)  relative price of tradables but are often accompanied by rising (falling) wages. Since prices 
and costs move in opposite directions this increases the instability in profits. By contrast, in the non-tradable sector 
there tends to be a positive correlation between prices and wages, thus stabilizing profits. A sufficient condition for 
this to hold is that the tradable sector be more capital intensive than the non-tradable sector.    32
exchange rate has served to choke off tradable activities, rendering growth less sustainable and 
more susceptible to negative shocks.   
 
We would complement the conventional arguments based on macroeconomic stability 
with the following microeconomic reasoning based on the importance we place on self-discovery. 
In a small open economy like Uruguay, the greatest returns to discovering high-productivity 
activities lie among tradable goods and services. This is so, because such activities can cater to 
the global market, instead of the small domestic market and hence, each discovery can be scaled 
to a much larger extent and hence make it much more valuable from a social point of view. In 
addition, it is harder to create the incentives for self-discovery in the tradable than in the non-
tradable sector. This arises from the fact that an innovator in the non-tradable sector –by 
definition – will start being a monopolist in that activity until he is copied by some other entrant 
in the local market. This period of monopoly may help create the rents that constitute the pay-off 
to entrepreneurship. By contrast, the first to produce some tradable good or service in Uruguay 
will not be the first in the world and hence will be participating in a market where there already 
is pre-existing competition. Hence, in this sector there is least room for entrepreneurial rents to 
stimulate experimentation and self-discovery.   
 
In this context, sustained real exchange rate depreciation increases the return to such 
entrepreneurship and acts as a subsidy to self-discovery in tradables.  Its impact on aggregate 
productivity and economic growth can therefore be sizable.  Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2004) find that growth accelerations tend to occur in periods in which the real exchange rate is 
significantly more depreciated than in the preceding period. 
  
Real exchange rate volatility and the growth process 
 
Large swings in the real exchange rate are not uncommon in Uruguay. Between 1980 and 
2003 the percentage distance between the most appreciated RER (observed in 1982) and the 
most depreciated RER (observed in 1990) was 96.8 percent. Even if we take 5-year moving 
averages, in order to capture the idea that investors may be able to look beyond short term 
fluctuation and look at longer term returns, the percentage difference between maximum and 
minimum amounts to 63.1 percent.   
 
This fact has two implications. First, real exchange rate volatility directly interferes 
with the self-discovery process.  Following the line of argument by Aghion et al (2004), the fact 
that self-discovery activities tend to have longer term returns than physical capital investment 
implies that they face more real exchange rate uncertainty. If the financial system is not 
developed enough to overcome these risks, self-discovery will be depressed and investment will 
be concentrated on the accumulation of physical capital to exploit existing ideas. Empirically, 
Aghion et al (2004) find that real exchange rate volatility is most damaging of growth in 
developing countries.  
 
Coupled with this finding, the arguments in Hausmann et al (2004b) in which RER 
volatility reduces the incentives to invest in tradables and hence lowers openness to create a high 
volatility equilibrium may also involve a low growth equilibrium.
13  
                                                 
13 Koren and Tenreyro (2004) propose an alternative mechanism through which RER volatility would lead to lower 
growth. They argue both theoretically and empirically that the high RER volatility in developing countries is the 
product of low diversification into differentiated intermediate inputs, as firms will have more difficulty in   33
 
The second implication of the large volatility of the real exchange rate in Uruguay is that 
it will tend to overwhelm modest microeconomic policy interventions (for example of the type 
we discussed in the preceding section).  The impact of any finely-tuned set of tax and/or subsidy 
incentive programs is likely to be swamped by large movements in the real exchange rate in 
either direction.  Microeconomic interventions matter less when the real exchange rate is (and 
stays) super-competitive; they will hardly make a difference when the real exchange appreciates. 
Today, it may make sense to invest in new seed varieties in rice, to control foot and mouth 
disease through tracking, to develop forests, plants and ports to export pulp and paper, to 
promote tourism in third markets and to provide the right institutional framework for the export 
of software, calling centers and other services. However, if the real exchange rate were to move 
by 60 percent – as has happened in a sustained manner over 5 year periods in the last 23 years –  
these activities will make much less sense and the economy will not develop the efforts that will 
allow these sectors to become productive and competitive.  
 
Here may lie in part the secret of the Chilean experience. After the dramatic collapse of 
the economy in 1982, Chilean economic policy became focused on preventing real appreciation 
through a myriad of instruments: crawling bands, massive intervention and sterilization, fiscal 
austerity, taxes on capital inflows, debt-equity swaps, internalization of the pension fund 
portfolios and others. Probably, beyond the effectiveness of each instrument lies the fact that 
investors understood that it was a policy goal of the government to protect the 
competitiveness and stability of the real exchange rate. This implicit contract may have had a 
lot to do with the growth experience of Chile vis a vis Argentina and Uruguay.  
 
Managing the real exchange rate 
 
We have argued that the real exchange rate may impact long-run growth through a set of 
unconventional channels which constitute externalities from the point of view of individual 
agents. Hence, a market-determined level and volatility of the RER may be socially inefficient 
and policies should be able to improve on them.  
 
A commitment to a competitive and stable real exchange rate 
 
It is fashionable these days to argue that monetary authorities should declare a 
commitment to low inflation and to reserve for itself operational discretion as to how to achieve 
this objective. If the commitment is serious and the set of instruments is powerful enough to 
achieve its goals, such a statement may also be credible and effective. We argue that the same 
overall logic applies to the real exchange rate although the policy apparatus may be quite 
different.  
 
A credible commitment to a competitive and stable real exchange rate would reduce the 
risk of self-discovery activities and investments in tradables and would increase the effective 
openness and diversification of the economy. This will reduce RER volatility. In addition, it will 
lower the relative importance of Argentine demand on the economy further stabilizing the RER. 
Finally, a more open economy will have a larger political constituency in favor of a competitive 
and stable RER, thus making its commitments in this area politically more credible. 
                                                                                                                                                             
responding to any shock to any given input. If investment in intermediates is thwarted by high volatility and at the 
same time increases it, this may constitute another form of a low growth trap.   34
 
Moreover, it is clear that what needs to be stabilized is the RER vis a vis global markets 
and not the regional market, as the latter is smaller, more volatile and less sensitive to the growth 
externalities we have identified. In addition, in many respects, a large part of the growth potential 
of Uruguay lies in activities that are substitutes and not complements of Argentine production. 
This is particularly clear in agriculture but is bound to be the case in other sectors. Hence, these 
activities would suffer in a world where the bilateral RER with Argentina and Brazil became 
stable at the expense of volatility in the RER vis a vis global markets.  
 
Hence, we would argue in favor of the idea of making the competitiveness and stability 
of the RER become a major commitment of the development strategy of Uruguay. It is 
important to understand the temptations that may pull the country away from this goal. First, 
from a fiscal and financial point of view, a more appreciated exchange rate –ceteris paribus– 
implies that the weight of dollar-denominated debt to GDP ratio will be lower. Would this not be 
a better strategy to improve the financial stability of the country? But ceteris is not paribus. A 
more depreciated and stable RER will cause GDP and exports to rise faster and the current 
account to be stronger, leading to both a slower growing numerator and a faster growing 
denominator. This is bound to lead to a more sustainable reduction in debt ratios.  
 
Second, a more appreciated RER, will lead to a lower price of tradables, such as food, 
and these enter significantly in the consumption basket of the poor. Would this not be better for 
welfare? Again, this is a very static argument. A strong RER would lead to higher 
unemployment and less higher-productivity job creation through the growth and discovery 
process.  
 
Beyond its desirability, the question is whether a more competitive and stable RER can 
be achieved through policy? And if so, how? We believe it can and will discuss which policy 
instruments to use for this purpose. We shall discuss fiscal policy, where the arguments outlined 
strengthen the case for prudence, and monetary, exchange rate and financial policies, where we 
depart more from the conventional wisdom.  
Fiscal policy 
 
In the long run, the real exchange rate will be impacted by the balance between aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand. A stronger demand will lead to a more appreciated RER. 
Fluctuations in aggregate demand will lead to a volatile long-run RER. In a world without full 
Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy can play a stabilizing anti-cyclical role. It can go into surplus 
when other sources of demand – say a temporary Argentine or capital inflows boom – and move 
into deficit when conditions worsen. However, a necessary condition for this to happen is that 
the overall solvency of the government be perceived as strong. A government with precarious 
creditworthiness will not be able to borrow in bad times to cushion the blow or to incur in quasi-
fiscal losses at the Central bank as part of a sterilization strategy. In this respect, targeting a 
cyclically adjusted fiscal surplus, as Chile has been doing lately, would be appropriate. As the 
surpluses accumulate and the economy grows, debt ratios will decline in a sustained manner and 
the anticipation of this trend will lower the cost of debt service much sooner. Prudent and anti-
cyclical fiscal policies, especially now that the economy is recovering, would contribute to the 
goal of a competitive and stable RER.    35
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
 
While in the long run, the RER is affected by aggregate supply and demand balances at 
full employment, in the short run, both the nominal and the real exchange rate are affected by 
equilibria in asset markets. In the standard Dornbusch (1976) model, exchange rate overshooting 
is the product of slow adjustment in the labor market in the context of fast adjustment in 
financial asset markets. So, what role should monetary and exchange rate policy play in 
achieving a competitive and stable RER?  
 
The conventional answer is none. It is common to argue that the task of achieving low 
inflation is so difficult already and the central bank has so few instruments that complicating its 
task with additional goals would be counter-productive. This is in part based on the idea of the 
impossible trinity: it is impossible to simultaneously achieve international financial integration, 
monetary independence and an effective target on the exchange rate. You may achieve two but 
not three of these goals. With international financial integration you must either choose between 
an exchange rate target or monetary independence.  
 
This has lead to the bi-polar view of exchange rate policies in which the central bank 
either pegs fully and credibly to a foreign currency – through dollarization or a currency board – 
or sets completely flexible exchange rates accompanied with some form of monetary or inflation 
targeting. After the failure of Argentine convertibility, floating exchange rates with inflation 
targeting have become the new fashion.  
 
Let us discuss how they work and see how they may interact with conditions for growth 
and self-discovery in the tradable sector. The standard approach to inflation targeting starts with 
a central bank that announces its inflation target and adjusts monetary policy in response to 
inflation expectations. Monetary policy is usually done through an interest rate that the central 
bank either sets or affects through open market operations. Intervention through interest rates has 
become more common because the alternative – monetary targets – tended to generate volatility 
in exchange rates and interest rates associated with the fact that money demand is volatile, but 
central banks cannot incorporate this source of variation in their money supply decisions.  
 
With inflation targeting, the central bank usually announces that it does not care about the 
exchange rate except in so far as it may affect inflation expectations. In this context, consider the 
following three shocks: an expansionary (or irresponsible) fiscal policy, an exogenous capital 
inflows boom and a boom in Argentina. An expansionary fiscal policy will lead to increased 
demand and inflationary expectations in the non-tradable market. The central bank would 
respond with a rise in interest rates which lower domestic demand and would appreciate the 
exchange rate, lowering the price of importables and exportables and causing a contraction in the 
tradable sector. This will free up resources to accommodate the increased demand of non-
tradables. Through both mechanisms inflation would be moderated, but the tradable sector would 
face a contraction caused by real appreciation. In other words, monetary policy sacrifices the 
tradable sector in order to make fiscal irresponsibility compatible with its inflation target. 
 
Consider now a capital inflows boom. Under an inflation targeting regime this will lead 
to exchange rate appreciation. This may moderate inflationary pressures allowing the central 
bank to reduce interest rates. The appreciation will lower the price of tradables and will reduce 
employment, investment and profits in this sector, thus freeing resources that will help expand   36
the supply of non-tradables in order to accommodate the increased demand caused by the lower 
interest rates. Again, the tradable sector contracts in order to accommodate the capital inflow. 
 
A boom in Argentina will cause an increased demand for regional goods. This will raise 
inflationary expectations and the central bank would respond with a combination of higher 
interest rates and a more appreciated exchange rate. Again, the global (i.e. non-regional)  
tradable sector will contract.  
 
What is common about these three examples is that the tradable sector plays, in this 
strategy, the role of front-line troops in the battle against inflation. Its expansion and contraction 
is called upon in order to contain inflation. Even in the case when it is fiscal profligacy that 
causes the inflationary pressures, the policy solution involves a real appreciation in order to 
contract, not the non-tradable sector which benefited from the fiscal expansion, but the tradable 
sector which did not. Under these conditions, the battle for low inflation may be won more easily, 
but the casualties disproportionally fall in the level and stability of the competitive conditions 
faced by the tradable sector.  
 
There is an added complication with the regime of inflation targeting when it is 
implemented in a country characterized by liability dollarization, such as Uruguay. Under these 
conditions, exchange rate fluctuations cause balance sheet effects that make a monetary 
expansion either less effective. When the central bank adopts an expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy, the concomitant exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) causes an adverse 
(favorable) balance sheet effect, making the impact less expansionary, or even contractionary 
(less contractionary or even expansionary). The balance sheet channel works against the normal 
channels of monetary policy limiting its impact on aggregate demand and forcing the central 
bank into larger interest rate movements (and hence real exchange rate changes) to achieve the 
same demand effect. 
 
In addition, a pure floating regime would involve no exchange rate intervention which 
means that the level of international reserves is not used to accommodate shocks to the demand 
for money. Instead these get absorbed by the exchange rate and the interest rate, making them 
more volatile. It would be ideal to use the level of reserves to absorb at least part of that volatility 
so as to leave a more stable RER environment, but a pure inflation targeting scheme does not 
have a clear policy rule on how to do this.  
 
For all these reasons, we believe that standard inflation targeting would not lead to a 
stable and competitive RER. Instead, it is bound to create too much RER and interest rate risk, 
and lead to other undesirable results, forcing the central bank into a series of modifications and 
ad hoc adjustments without a coherent policy, as for example, in Colombia.   
 
We propose instead to complement a pure inflation targeting scheme with a loose real 
exchange rate commitment both by the fiscal and monetary authorities and more activism on the 
side of financial and capital account policies. Fiscal policy should be set with an eye on the 
competitiveness and the stability of the real exchange rate. This can be achieved with a 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus, as argued above. Monetary policy should allow the exchange 
rate to float but should announce a central parity. It should be ready to intervene in the exchange 
rate market when it feels the deviations are inconvenient. It need not announce a band, as this 
could create destabilizing speculation around the edges of the band.     37
 
The underlying model behind this strategy assumes that the central bank cares not only 
about inflation and output today, but also about growth tomorrow, which is affected by the level 
and stability of the real exchange rate. Hence, the central bank needs to express a target for the 
real exchange rate and develop instruments to reach it. This is what we shall discuss below.  
 
What should the central bank be ready to do when there are what it deems to be excessive 
pressures towards real appreciation?  The first order of business would be, of course, simple 
unsterilized intervention, i.e. with the purchase of international reserves with cash. This will 
expand base money and cause a reduction in interest rates. As the rates decline, capital will stop 
flowing in. However, the base money created in the process may lead to a credit boom which 
may potentially create expansionary pressures at home and cause inflation to accelerate with its 
negative effects on inflation and competitiveness. This risk should not be exaggerated. Consider, 
for example, the case of China. The country has purchased some US$ 480 billion in unsterilized 
international reserves and after a long period in which markets feared deflation, prices in 2004 
are now rising at a rate of 5 percent forcing the government to take action. However, this has not 
taken place through currency appreciation.  Instead credit and public enterprise policies have 
been tightened. The point is that a policy of unsterilized intervention will at worst create 
inflationary pressures that are bound to happen gradually, through pressures in the labor market 
instead of suddenly through real appreciation. As they take place, there may be time to respond 
to them through other policies.  
 
One alternative to unsterilized intervention is sterilized intervention, i.e. the purchase of 
international reserves but accompanied with an open market operation designed to limit the 
expansionary effect on the supply of money. We are less enthusiastic about this policy: it will 
lead to a potentially large quasi-fiscal deficit and may become unsustainable as it tends to keep 
interest rates high which will attract more speculative capital inflows. In the end, it may be 
expensive and ineffective.  
 
Instead, we would propose to contain aggregate demand pressures through other means. 
Besides fiscal policy, already mentioned above, financial policies may help. An alternative to 
sterilization through open market operations is reserve requirements on banks. If sterilization 
leads to an expansion of monetary aggregates that are deemed too high and unsustainable, the 
central bank can act to lower the money multiplier. One way to do this is through increased 
reserve requirements. This will finance indirectly the purchase of international reserves by the 
central bank, but as opposed to sterilization, will lower deposit interest rates which will dampen 
capital inflows. These reserve requirements may or may not be remunerated, but the rate at 
which they are should be below the deposit rate.  
 
Another instrument is the adjustment of capital adequacy requirements on banks. The 
expansionary effects of unsterilized intervention on bank credit can be limited by requiring banks 
to back up their credit with more of their own capital. This makes prudential sense because it will 
limit credit booms, which often end in tears. Moreover, it will make the capital adequacy 
requirement part of an anti-cyclical policy stance which is prudentially sound: when the external 
environment turns less buoyant, banks will have the capital base to face the coming difficulties.  
 
An additional mechanism is to opportunistically fight liability dollarization in good times. 
When capital inflows threaten real appreciation, prudential norms regarding foreign borrowing of   38
banks can be tightened. Foreign bank loans should under any circumstance be subject to reserve 
requirements. This will act as the equivalent of a tax on capital inflows, which can be adjusted 
given the circumstances. Dollar lending to non-tradable activities must generate a higher capital 
adequacy requirement in order to cover the implicit currency risk. This will limit the expansion 
of credit to the booming non-tradable sector while it will protect financial conditions in the 
tradable sector. If this is done effectively in good times, when the situation turns sour, the 
balance sheet effects will be that much smaller and the situation that much more stable.  
 
In short, prudential norms on foreign borrowing by Uruguayan banks can act as implicit 
capital controls while prudential norms on foreign currency lending can be used in a prudentially 
sound manner to avoid over-valuation.  
 
In addition, foreign investment rules on pension funds can be adjusted to fight real 
appreciation. If capital inflows are excessive, foreign investment restrictions can be 
opportunistically relaxed. Internationalizing the portfolio of pension funds makes sense in order 
to protect workers from the volatility in the local market. Doing this in bad times is impractical, 
as it would exacerbate external imbalances. But in good times, it allows to achieve a long-term 
goal while contributing to shorter term stability of the RER. As the experience of Chile shows, 
there is an additional benefit of allowing pension funds to invest abroad: they will help develop 
the market for long term currency hedges. As the liabilities of the pension funds are in pesos and 
part of their assets will be in dollars, they will want to enter long term currency swaps in order to 
protect their returns from an unexpected appreciation in the RER. This is the opposite fear of the 
one faced by dollar borrowers. The development of this market may help reduce and better 
distribute the currency risks caused by liability dollarization.  
 
In synthesis, the central bank and the government can fight what they deem to be 
unwarranted real appreciation through an arsenal of potential tools that include fiscal contraction, 
unsterilized intervention, reserve requirements, capital adequacy requirements, requirements on 
foreign borrowing and the regulation of pension funds. The commitment to keep the RER stable 
and competitive need not involve a fixed RER with zero risk. The actual RER will fluctuate 
around the announced target. Instead, the target should be viewed as an implicit contract which 
signals the government’s intention and gives a sense of priority to its macroeconomic strategy.  
 
The authorities can review their RER target in line with new information. For example, if 
the country has a tight labor market in the context of a current account surplus and relatively low 
terms of trade, this would constitute prima facie evidence that the RER is undervalued. But if 
unemployment is above its natural rate then it should wait until it expects it to come down before 
announcing a move in the RER target. If the current account is in deficit, or if it is in a surplus 
attributable to unusually favorable temporary external conditions, it should not move its target.  
 
In addition, the authorities should treat the RER target as indicative and should not 
commit to any given band around the target. Through time the authorities and the market will 
learn about the effectiveness of its instruments and the credibility of its stance. If it is successful, 
the market will help achieve the target through stabilizing speculation, a la Krugman (1988).  
 
With this approach we believe that the RER volatility of past years can be significantly 
mitigated. If successful, the country will grow out of its volatility problem through increased   39
openness and diversification. In the meantime, a clear commitment to a stable and competitive 
RER is a key element for the strategy of structural transformation.  
 
Exchanging RER risk 
 
The policies described in the previous subsection attempt to reduce RER volatility by 
using macroeconomic policies. In this section we discuss interventions designed to lower the 
RER risk faced by certain activities in the tradable sector, without affecting the RER itself. These 
policies are based in transferring or exchanging the existing risk.  
 
The simplest example is currency swaps. The Uruguayan government has the bulk of its 
debt denominated in US dollars. As such it fears a real depreciation, since it would increase the 
debt service burden. By contrast, the tradable sector fears a real appreciation, since it would 
increase costs and lower prices. Both parties can solve the problem by exchanging the currency 
risks through a forward contract. The government gives up its potential gains from a real 
appreciation in exchange for avoiding the potential losses caused by a real depreciation. The 
tradable sector could do the opposite.  
 
This market does not exist in Uruguay, but it is in the double interest of the government 
that this market take off since it would lower its own debt service risk and  would promote 
tradable development by allowing the sector to hedge its RER risk. It can kill two birds with one 
stone because it can exploit the fact that the tradable sector has the opposite financial risk to its 
own. An equivalent market can be generated or stimulated using options instead of forwards.  
 
It is improbable that a deep market will develop any time soon and when it does it will 
very short-run relative to the risks faced by new tradable activities. However, the government 
should be willing to enter into over-the-counter deals for investors in these activities as a way to 
insure them against real RER appreciation. One example would be to offer out-of-the money 
RER puts on their future dollar exports. This will reduce the risk of investors but would only 
become a fiscal cost at a time when RER appreciation had made the debt service burden smaller.    40
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